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JAPAN’S UNDER-RESEARCHED VISIBLE 
MINORITIES: APPLYING CRITICAL RACE 
THEORY TO RACIALIZATION DYNAMICS IN A 
NON-WHITE SOCIETY 
DR. DEBITO ARUDOU

 
ABSTRACT 
Critical Race Theory (CRT), an analytical framework grounded in 
American legal academia, uncovers power relationships between a 
racialized enfranchised majority and a disenfranchised minority. Although 
applied primarily to countries and societies with Caucasian majorities to 
analyze White Privilege this Article applies CRT to Japan, a non-White 
majority society. After discussing how scholarship on Japan has hitherto 
ignored a fundamental factor within racialization studies—the effects of 
skin color on the concept of “Japaneseness”—this Article examines an 
example of published research on the Post-WWII “konketsuji problem.”1 
This research finds blind spots in the analysis, and re-examines it through 
CRT to uncover more nuanced power dynamics. This exercise attempts to 
illustrate the universality of nation-state racialization processes, and 
advocates the expansion of Whiteness Studies beyond Caucasian-majority 
societies into worldwide Colorism dynamics in general. 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE TERMS AND THE DYNAMICS: CRITICAL RACE 
THEORY, EMBEDDED RACISM, AND VISIBLE MINORITIES 
A. Critical Race Theory 
To analyze societies in terms of social hierarchies and power relations, 
Critical Race Theory (CRT), an analytical framework that first appeared in 
American legal academia, may offer fresh insights when applied to other 
countries. CRT sees racism as a study of power relations within a society, 
particularly in terms of how people are rendered into hierarchical 
 
 
  Hawaii Pacific University. Dr. Debito Arudou is the author of eight books about life and 
human rights in Japan and is the Just Be Cause regular monthly newspaper columnist for The Japan 
Times. His latest book, “Embedded Racism: Japan’s Visible Minorities and Racial Discrimination in 
Japan,” was published by Lexington Books in November 2015. 
 1.  The “konketsuji problem” is the existence of “mixed-blood children” in Japanese society 
(mostly from Japanese=Non-Japanese unions during the American Occupation of Japan). 
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categories of power, social dominance, and wealth acquisition. 2 
Fundamental theories synthesizing economic and postcolonial arguments 
have a long history, going back to W.E.B. DuBois.3 DuBois linked the 
abolition of American slavery with the convergence of white economic 
and postcolonial interests, as opposed to the narrative of American society 
being convinced by “moral good” and “just society” arguments. CRT first 
appeared in the 1970s in response to perceived shortcomings within the 
American Civil Rights Movement, grounded in minority frustrations at 
being underrepresented within American public discourse and academia.4 
Incorporating various criticisms from Ethnic Studies, Women’s Studies, 
Cultural Nationalism, Critical Legal Studies, Marxism and Neo-Marxism, 
and Internal Colonial models,5 CRT has expanded out of deconstructing 
legal and judicial processes and into other fields, including 
deconstructions of education, public discourse, gender, ethnicity, class and 
poverty, globalization, immigration and international labor migration, hate 
speech, the meritocracy, and identity politics. CRT has also been expanded 
beyond America’s borders to examine postcolonialism and power 
structures in other societies, including Great Britain, Israel, and Europe.6 
This article will similarly expand CRT into Japan. 
In terms of analyzing the racialized structural relationships of social 
power, this research argues that CRT may be applied to any society. CRT 
starts from the fundamental standpoints that, inter alia, (1) “race” is purely 
a social construct without inherent physiological or biological meaning, so 
it is open to the same perceptional distortions and manipulations as any 
other social convention or ideology; (2) the prejudicial discourses about 
human categorization and treatment are so hegemonic that they become 
part of the “normal” in society; that is to say, so embedded in the everyday 
workings of society that they give rise to discriminatory actions (both 
conscious and unconscious), resulting in discriminatory public policies 
 
 
 2.  Cf. RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 
(1st ed. 2001, 2d ed. 2012). See also CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE 
MOVEMENT (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).  
 3.  W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE NEGRO, 233–34 (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform 2011) 
(1905). 
 4.  Crenshaw et al., supra note 2, at xxii–xxvii. 
 5. See Daniel G. Solorzano and Tara J. Yosso, Critical race and LatCrit theory and method: 
counter-storytelling, 14 QUALITATIVE STUDIES IN EDUC. 471, 471–95 (2001). 
 6. DELGADO & STEFANCIC (2012), supra note 2, at 474. See also CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: 
LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, eds., 1997); Mathias Möschel, 
Race in Mainland European Legal Analysis: Towards a European Critical Race Theory, 34 ETHNIC & 
RACIAL STUDIES 1648, 1648 (2011); Fumi Sakata, A Critique of Critical Race Theory: A Textual 
Analysis of the ‘Mr. Gaijin’ Mask (Aug. 2012) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Queen’s University), 
available at https://qspace.library.queensu.ca/bitstream/1974/7387/1/Sakata_Fumi_201208_MA.pdf. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss4/13
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and laws regardless of policymaker intentions; (3) such illusory 
perceptions of “race” are in fact the central, endemic and permanent 
driving force behind organizing the scaffolding of human interaction, 
categorization, and regulation, both at the individual and more poignantly 
the legislative level; (4) “race” thus fundamentally influences, even 
grounds, the formation, enforcement, and amendment process of a 
society’s laws; (5) those who best understand this dynamic and its effects 
are the people disadvantaged within the racialized structure of power and 
privilege, and thus are necessarily excluded from the discourse regarding 
the organization of society; and, consequently, (6) one must also recognize 
the power of minority narratives as a means to allow more minority voices 
and alternative insights into the discussion, to expose the realities present 
for the unprivileged and underprivileged.7 
The dynamic of racism under CRT is one of power and self-
perpetuation of the status quo. Racism is seen as necessarily existing to 
advance and promote, both materially and psychologically, the interests 
and privileges of members within the dominant power structure. In 
America’s case, CRT helped foster “Whiteness Studies” to examine the 
power and preference (e.g., material wealth, prestige, privilege, 
opportunity, etc.) that both naturally and not-so-naturally accrues to the 
White majority or elite.8 Due to the “normalization” of this dynamic, it 
becomes self-perpetuating, where even the most well-intentioned members 
of the elite will have little awareness or incentive to eliminate this system 
(due in part to “structural determinism”9 i.e., the milieu in which people 
have been raised and live their lives necessarily makes them blind to the 
viewpoints and needs of people who have not). The only time there may 
be power ceded to non-dominant peoples is when there is “interest 
convergence,” i.e., when the dominant majority and minorities both stand 
to gain from a policy shift; then current racial paradigms will be discarded 
and shifted instead to disfavor another weakened, easily-targeted 
disenfranchised minority.10 In this sense, racisms and racialisms will shift 
 
 
 7. Cf. DELGADO & STEFANCIC (2012), supra note 2, at 474; CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES, supra 
note 6; Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C. R.-
C. L. L. REV. 323, 323–99 (1987). There are, naturally, other tenets in CRT’s very broad spectrum of 
disciplines, but the above are the tenets germane to this article. Given its roots in dissent and diversity, 
CRT as a multidisciplinary umbrella theory is flexible enough in its application within academic 
disciplines to allow for a selection of approaches.  
  8. DELGADO & STEFANCIC (2001), supra note 2, at 75–77.  
  9. Mark A. Mone, Structural Determinism, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
ORGANIZATION STUDIES 1477, 1478–80 (James R. Bailey & Stewart R. Clegg eds., 2008).  
 10.  Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 93 
HARV. L. REV. 518, 518–33 (1980).  
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over time, but will nevertheless continue to exist and remain a 
fundamental ordering force within a society.11 Although these analytical 
paradigms have been applied primarily to the American example, this 
research argues that the same dynamics can be seen in the Japanese 
example by substituting “white” with “Japanese.”12 
B. Overlooked Discrimination Dynamics in Japan: The Need for a New 
Lens 
Research on discrimination in Japan generally focuses on groups 
including the Burakumin historical underclass caste, the Zainichi ethnic 
Koreans generational “foreigners” born and raised in Japan, the Ainu and 
Okinawan indigenous peoples, women, the physically and mentally infirm, 
the elderly, children, former leprosy victims, crime victims, HIV sufferers, 
the homeless, ex-convicts, foreigners, and victims of human trafficking, 
North Korean kidnappings, and other forms of bullying and social abuse.13 
This is, of course, a viable categorization of groups who face 
discrimination in Japanese society. However, the categorization of 
“foreigners” within, and the research on discrimination against them in 
Japan, is often flawed because it is not always inclusive of all minorities in 
Japan.  
For example, scholarship on Japan’s minorities tends to focus on 
Zainichi generational foreigners such as Koreans and Chinese 
“Oldcomers,” and Chinese/Nikkei etc. migrant/immigrant labor 
“Newcomers.”14 That focus is more upon discrimination as a function of 
 
 
 11.  ROBERT MILES, RACISM AFTER ‘RACE RELATIONS’ (1993).  
 12.  Mark A. Levin, Hihanteki Jinshu Riron To Nihonhō: Wajin To Jinshuteki Tokken Ni Tsuite 
[The Wajin’s Whiteness: Law and Race Privilege in Japan] 80 HŌRITSU JIHŌ 80, 80–91 (2008) 
(Japan), translation available at https://www.law.hawaii.edu/sites/www.law.hawaii.edu/files/content/ 
events/19765/Levin.Wajin's_Whiteness.Horitsu_Jiho_Feb._2008.English.pdf. 
  13. See, e.g., Yoshio Sugimoto, An Introduction to Japanese Society (1997); John Clammer, 
Japan and Its Others (2001); Ian J. Neary, Burakumin in Contemporary Japan, in Japan’s Minorities: 
The Illusion of Homogeneity 59, 59–83 (Weiner ed., 2d ed. 2009); Hideo Aoki, Buraku Culture, in 
The Cambridge companion to Modern Japanese Culture 182, 182–98 (Yoshio Sugimoto ed., 2009); 
Japan’s Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity (Michael Weiner ed., 2d ed. 2009); Bureau of Human 
Rights, H.21 Keihatsu katsudō nenkan kyōchō jikō [Points of emphasis for 2009's "enlightenment" 
activities], Ministry of Justice (Aug. 7, 2015), Bureau of Human Rights, Dai-64 Jinken Shūkan 
[Human Rights Week events], Ministry of Justice (Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.moj.go.jp/ 
JINKEN/jinken03.html. 
 14. See, e.g., Ann B. Cary, Affiliation, Not Assimilation: Resident Koreans and Ethnic 
Education, in STUDIES IN JAPANESE BILINGUALISM 98, 98–132 (Mary G. Nogushi & Sandra Fotos 
eds., 2000); Erin A. Chung, Korean Voluntary Associations in Japanese Civil Society (Japan Policy 
Research Institute, Working Paper No. 69, 2000), available at http://www.jpri.org/publications/ 
workingpapers/wp69.html; YASUNORI FUKUOKA, LIVES OF YOUNG KOREANS IN JAPAN (2000); 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss4/13
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nationality and legal status, not as a racialization process: “In contrast with 
the dominance of racial categories as in the United States, the 
Japanese/foreigner binary is salient in Japan.” “Legally, Japanese ancestry 
is a purely civil, not racial status.” 15  This sometimes engenders a 
hierarchical mindset towards “foreigners” who “look different” (e.g., 
Caucasians, non-Asian naturalized citizens etc.), putting them at a 
rhetorical disadvantage. They allegedly (a) are not as discriminated against 
as other minority groups (such as the Zainichi, who have been in Japan 
longer), 16  (b) are only temporary workers, not long-term residents or 
immigrants (again in contrast to the Zainichi), or (c) are in numbers small 
enough to be negligible; in other words, foreigners who are “visibly 
different” simply do not count.17  This approach nevertheless results in 
hundreds of thousands of people living in Japan, including Japanese 
citizens, being overlooked or omitted from studies of racism in Japan.  
Researchers also tend to overlook issues of racial discrimination by 
focusing on the international migration of labor into Japan vis-à-vis 
national migration policies and legal issues. These analyses do offer 
valuable observations from a comparative international perspective, 
instructive for scholars and policymakers of international migration (e.g., 
 
 
DANIEL T. LINGER, NO ONE HOME: BRAZILIAN SELVES REMADE IN JAPAN (2001); JOSHUA H. ROTH, 
BROKERED HOMELAND: JAPANESE BRAZILIAN MIGRANTS IN JAPAN (2002). NAOTO HIGUCHI & 
KIYOKO TANNō, What’s driving Brazil-Japan migration? The making and remaking of the Brazilian 
niche in Japan, 12 INT’L J. OF JAPANESE SOC. 33, 33–47 (2003); SEARCHING FOR HOME ABROAD: 
JAPANESE BRAZILIANS AND TRANSNATIONALISM (Jeffrey Lesser ed., 2003); TAKEYUKI TSUDA, 
STRANGERS IN THE ETHNIC HOMELAND (2003); Hiroshi Tanaka and Kim Geduk, NICHI/KAN “KYŌSEI 
SHAKAI” NO TENBŌ, KANKOKU DE GENJITSU SHITA GAIOKJIN CHIHŌ SANSEIKEN [A VIEW 
TO A JAPANESE/KOREAN “COEXISTENCE SOCIETY”: FOREIGNER LOCAL SUFFRAGE PUT INTO 
EFFECT IN SOUTH KOREA], 2006; APICHAI A. SHIPPER, FIGHTING FOR FOREIGNERS: IMMIGRATION 
AND ITS IMPACT ON JAPANESE DEMOCRACY (2008); DIASPORA WITHOUT HOMELAND: BEING KOREAN 
IN JAPAN (Sonia Ryang & John Lie eds., 2009); Simon Nantais, Koreans and the Politics of Nationality 
and Race during the Allied Occupation of Japan, 1945–1952 (Aug. 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Victoria) available at http://dspace.library.uvic.ca/bitstream/handle/1828/ 
3532/Nantais_Simon_PhD_2011.pdf?sequence=5&isAllowed=y. 
 15. Chikako Kashiwazaki, The Politics of Legal Status: the Equation of Nationality with 
Ethnonational Identity, in DIASPORA WITHOUT HOMELAND: BEING KOREAN IN JAPAN 121, 144 (Sonia 
Ryang & John Lie eds., 2009); William Wetherall, The Racialization of Japan, in TRANSCULTURAL 
JAPAN: AT THE BORDERLANDS OF RACE, GENDER AND IDENTITY 264, 281 (David B. Willis & Stephen 
Murphy-Shigematsu eds., 2008).  
 16. An example of this mindset was expressed as a question during an interview with the author: 
“You have described yourself as a ‘human rights’ activist. The term evokes images of previous 
activists such as Martin Luther King, Jr., Desmond Tutu and Gandhi, to name a few—all 
disenfranchised that were born and raised as such. Isn’t your descriptive taking it a bit far considering 
that you are an Ivy-educated, middle-class, white male from the United States who is only feeling a 
sliver of the discrimination today?” Interview by Japan Review.net with the author, November 17, 
2001, available at http://www.japanreview.net/interview_dave.htm (accessed Aug. 9, 2015).  
 17. HARUMI BEFU, THE HEGEMONY OF HOMOGENEITY 75 (2001).  
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how long-term “foreigners” face significant barriers to becoming citizens 
and/or to becoming more enfranchised members of Japanese society, in 
contrast to other developed democratic nations tending to enfranchise its 
permanent-resident non-citizens as “denizens”).18 However, this tends to 
overlook how the determination of nationality/citizenship (and the barriers 
to becoming “Japanese”) is not only a matter of legal status, but also an 
issue of visual identification at the “micro” levels of society. These 
analyses also underplay the discourses at the “macro” level, i.e., how 
racialization is a natural function of the general maintenance of imagined 
communities and nation-states. As Zachmann notes, “Racism is a venom 
that poisons the very sources of law.”19 Thus studies of discrimination in 
Japan by legal status alone are insufficient and must go deeper, with new 
terminology. 
C. The New Lenses: Visible Minorities and Embedded Racism 
In addressing issues of racism, this research is therefore neither a 
general denouncement of the people of Japan as “racists,” nor does it 
intend to show that most people in Japan are even conscious “racists.” 
Instead, this research intends to outline the contours of the conscious and 
unconscious rules of interaction, and the tacit, “embedded” understandings 
within Japanese society that lead to differentiated, “othering,” and 
subordinated treatment of peoples by physical appearance. It will also 
outline how those rules and understandings are systemically created, 
 
 
  18. Cf. TOMAS HAMMAR, DEMOCRACY AND THE NATION STATE: ALIENS, DENIZENS, AND 
CITIZENS IN A WORLD OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION (1990); Takamichi Kajita, The Challenge of 
Incorporating Foreigners in Japan: ‘Ethnic Japanese’ and ‘Sociological Japanese’, in TEMPORARY 
WORKERS OF FUTURE CITIZENS: JAPANESE AND U.S. MIGRATION POLICIES, 120, 120–47 (Myron 
Weiner & Hanami Tadashi eds., 1998); TAKAMICHI KAJITA, GAIKOKUJIN RŌDŌSHA TO NIHON 
[FOREIGN WORKERS AND JAPAN] (1994); ATSUSHI KONDŌ, “GAIKOKUJIN” NO SANSEIKEN: 
DENIZUNSHIPPU NO HIKAKU KENKYŪ [SUFFRAGE FOR “FOREIGNERS”: COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF 
DENIZENSHIP] (1996); Tadashi Hanami, Japanese Policies on the Rights and Benefits Granted to 
Foreign Workers, Residents, Refugees, and Illegals, in TEMPORARY WORKERS OF FUTURE CITIZENS: 
JAPANESE AND U.S. MIGRATION POLICIES 211, 211–37 (Myron Weiner & Hanami Tadashi eds., 
1998), Chikako Kashiwazaki, Jus Sanguinis in Japan: The Origin of Citizenship in a Comparative 
Perspective, 39 INT’L J. OF COMP. SOC. 278, 278–300 (1998); Chikako Kashiwazaki, Citizenship in 
Japan: Legal Practice and Contemporary Development, in FROM MIGRANTS TO CITIZENS: 
MEMBERSHIP IN A CHANGING WORLD 121, 144 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer eds., 
2000); Kashiwazaki supra note 15; HIROSHI KOMAI, NIHON NO GAIKOKUJIN IMIN [JAPAN’S FOREIGN 
IMMIGRANTS] (1999); HIROSHI KOMAI, FOREIGN MIGRANTS IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN (2001); and 
AKIHIRO ASAKAWA, KINDAI NIHON TO KIKA SEIDO [NATURALIZATION IN THE [SIC] MODERN JAPAN] 
(2007). 
 19. Urs M. Zachmann, Race and International Law in Japan’s New Order in East Asia, 1938–
1945, in RACE AND RACISM IN MODERN EAST ASIA: WESTERN AND EASTERN CONSTRUCTIONS 453–
73 (Rotem Kowner & Walter Demel eds., 2012).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss4/13
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normalized, and perpetuated by Japan’s social structures (e.g., laws and 
public policies, and especially in their interpretation and enforcement) and 
a national discourse (e.g., messages in the media). These dynamics within 
the social construction of community are found in all societies and are of 
course not limited to Japan. However, in Japan’s case, the racial link 
between physical appearance and legally-enforced rights as a “Japanese” 
has a direct impact on Japan’s future, particularly on its ability to tolerate 
and co-opt diversity.  
This research calls this theoretical dynamic “Embedded Racism.” This 
term has been adapted from Goldberg and Essed20 and will be defined for 
the purposes of this Article as: The overt, covert, subtle, or implicit 
expression of a normalized, hegemonic racialized discourse, that is hidden 
and anchored in daily interpersonal interactions, laws and law 
enforcement, media, and other public dialogue, which has the effect of 
differentiating, ‘othering,’ and subordinating people into a predetermined 
group or social status within a social order. This research focuses upon 
how an Embedded Racism affects “Visible Minorities” in Japanese 
society. 
“Visible Minority” is an established term for societal analysis. 
Approved by the Canadian Government as an official legal status in 2009, 
Visible Minorities refer to people who belong to a visually identifiable 
group as defined by Canada’s Employment Equity Act, i.e., “persons, 
other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-
white in colour.”21 In Canada, Visible Minorities are mainly people of 
Chinese, South Asian, Black, Arab, West Asian, Filipino, Southeast Asian, 
Latin American, Japanese and Korean heritage; in other words, from a 
performative perspective, these are people who on first glance may not 
look “Canadian” in terms of physical appearance and “visual 
identification.” Although this governmental definition does not extend 
beyond Canada’s borders, “Visible Minority” has also become an accepted 
term for rigorous analysis in Canadian academia.22 This Article will apply 
it to Japanese Studies. For the purpose of this research, “Visible 
Minorities” are residents of Japan who are visually identified as not 
 
 
 20. ANATOMY OF RACISM, at xv (David T. Goldberg ed., 1990); Philomena Essed, Everyday 
Racism: A New Approach to the Study of Racism, in RACE CRITICAL THEORIES: TEXT AND CONTEXT 
176–94 (Philomena Essed & David Goldberg eds., 2002).  
 21. See Visible Minority of Person, STAT. CAN. (Apr. 22, 2015), available at www.statcan.gc.ca/ 
concepts/definitions/minority-minorite1-eng.htm.  
 22. See Mai Stafford, Bruce K. Newbold, & Nancy A. Ross, Psychological Distress Among 
Immigrants and Visible Minorities in Canada: A Contextual Analysis, 57 INT’L. J. SOC. PSYCHIATRY 
428 (2010).  
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“looking Japanese” (e.g., Subcontinental Indians, the African Diaspora, 
Caucasians, Middle-Easterners, non-Nikkei South Americans, some South 
Asians etc.), and are thus treated as “not Japanese.” 
II. PLUGGING THESE TERMS INTO RESEARCH ON JAPAN: “BLIND SPOTS” 
VIS-À-VIS RACISM BY VISUAL IDENTIFICATION IN JAPAN 
Research that does recognize discrimination against “foreigners” 
beyond purely legal status also tends to overlook (if not dismiss) racialized 
visual identification as a factor, focusing instead on ethnic identification, 
ethnic self-identification, and/or broader issues of culture and belief 
systems. Clammer includes in his analysis of Japan’s “Others” even 
“cognitive minorities” (e.g., discrimination against Sōka Gakkai religious 
group members), and avoids visual identification altogether—stating 
tersely that “ethnic differentiation is in many ways simply an 
epiphenomenon.”23 Komai, despite extensive research on the lives of non-
Japanese minorities in Japan, offers no rigorous treatment or even a clear 
definition of “racism” in his earlier analysis of Japan’s treatment of 
migrant workers; his later work eschews “race relations” in favor of 
“ethnic relations.”24 Lie (rightly) eschews “race” as a scientific concept 
(preferring instead to focus upon the existence of ethnicities and the 
interplay of multi-ethnic groups in Japan), but then under-analyzes how 
visual identification plays a part in separating people into those multi-
ethnic groups (or, more to the point of this research, how it separates 
people, including multiethnic Japanese children, into the binary of 
Japanese and Gaijin).25 Befu’s influential work on Japanese identity also 
construes “racism” in Japan as a matter of ethnicity rather than visual 
identification: “Because the large numbers of Koreans and Chinese who 
live in Japan are racially indistinguishable from Japanese, the prejudicial 
attitude Japanese have toward them is more a case of ethnic prejudice and 
discrimination, that is, ethnocentrism, rather than racial prejudice. . . .”26 
 
 
 23. CLAMMER supra note 13, at 7. 
 24. HIROSHI KOMAI, GAIKOKUJIN RŌDŌSHA TEIJŪ E NO MICHI [THE PATH TO FOREIGN WORKER 
SETTLEMENT] (1993); HIROSHI KOMAI, MIGRANT WORKERS IN JAPAN (1995); HIROSHI KOMAI, NIHON 
NO GAIKOKUJIN IMIN [JAPAN’S FOREIGN IMMIGRANTS] (1999); HIROSHI KOMAI, FOREIGN MIGRANTS 
IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN (2001).  
 25. See DIASPORA WITHOUT HOMELAND: BEING KOREAN IN JAPAN, supra note 14, at 1–5.  
 26. See BEFU supra note 17, at 75. There of course are many other books on specific ethnic and 
social-origin minorities in Japan. See, e.g., Chung, supra note 14; MULTICULTURAL JAPAN: 
PALEOLITHIC TO POSTMODERN (Donald Denoon ed., 1996); DIASPORA WITHOUT HOMELAND: BEING 
KOREAN IN JAPAN, supra note 14; DIVERSITY IN JAPANESE CULTURE AND LANGUAGE (John C. Maher 
& Gaynor Macdonald eds., 1995); YOSHIO SUGIMOTO, THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO MODERN 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss4/13
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Although all of the above analyses have correctly identified root causes 
of several types of discrimination in Japan, they overlooked what 
happened at “Japanese Only” establishments, where “foreigners” have 
been excluded based on sight-identification alone.27 Ethnocentrism, ethnic 
self-identification, or even legal status were not factors in the visual 
identification of excluded customers at, for example, Yunohana public hot 
spring baths in Otaru City, Japan.28 That is to say: bathhouse managers 
undertook no “ethnocentric” survey of customers” ethnicity—they just 
identified and kicked out the gaijin (“foreign”-looking people) based upon 
their instant visual identification of biological markers. The canon remains 
blind to this strand of discrimination towards Visible Minorities, with 
deleterious effects on otherwise sound research on racism and minorities 
in Japan.  
 
 
JAPANESE CULTURE (2009); TSUDA, supra note 14; ROTH, supra note 14; SHIPPER, supra note 14, also 
including works authored and edited by Chung, Denoon et al., Ryang & Lie, Lie, Linger, Maher & 
MacDonald, Sugimoto, Tsuda, Roth, Shipper, etc. While each of these works deserves inclusion in a 
review in terms of its approach to racism in Japan, for the sake of brevity, this Article shall let the 
examples above and below suffice to illustrate some basic analytical shortcomings in the canon. 
 27. See, e.g. Debito Arudou, On Racism and Xenophobia in Japan, (report submitted to United 
Nations Special Rapporteur Doudou Diene, July 6, 2005), available at http://www.debito.org/ 
rapporteur.html#july2005; Debito Arudou, Gaikokujin’ Nyūten Kinshi to iu Jinshu Sabetsu [“No 
Foreigners Allowed”: Racial Discrimination], in NIHON NO MINZOKU SABETSU: JINSHU SABETSU 
TEPPAI JŌYAKU KARA MITA KADAI [ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION IN JAPAN: ISSUES FROM THE 
PERSPECTIVE OF THE UN CERD TREATY] 218, 218–29 (Okamoto Masataka ed., 2005); DEBITO 
ARUDOU, JAPANĪZU ONRĪ: OTARU ONSEN NYŪYOKU KYOHI MONDAI TO JINSHU SABETSU [JAPANESE 
ONLY: THE OTARU HOT SPRINGS CASE AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JAPAN] (2d ed. 2006); 
DEBITO ARUDOU, JAPANESE ONLY: THE OTARU HOT SPRINGS CASE AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN 
JAPAN (2d ed. 2006); DEBITO ARUDOU, “EMBEDDED RACISM”: JAPAN’S VISIBLE MINORITIES AND 
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (2015); Otaru Lawsuit Website Archive, Background to the Otaru Onsens 
Case (1993-Dec 31, 2000), available at www.debito.org/lawsuitbackground.html (specifically the 
exhaustive vault of all collectable non-tabloid (and some tabloid) media regarding the Otaru Onsens 
Case from its inception on September 19, 1999 to its end on April 8, 2005); Debito Arudou, Chapter 2: 
Race and Nationality-based Entrance Refusals at Private and Quasi Public Establishments, in NGO 
Report Regarding the Rights of Non-Japanese Nationals, Minorities of Foreign Origins, and Refugees 
in Japan (compiled by Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan for the 76th United Nations Committee 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination February 2010 meeting), available at http://www2.ohchr. 
org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/ ngos/SNMJ_Japan_76.doc; Debito Arudou, Rogues’ Gallery of 
Exclusionary Establishments, DEBITO.ORG (2011), www.debito.org/roguesgallery.html; Debito 
Arudou, An Introduction to Japanese Society’s Attitudes Towards Race and Skin Color, in THE 
MELANIN MILLENNIUM: SKIN COLOR AS THE 21ST CENTURY INTERNATIONAL DISCOURSE 49, 49–70 
(Ronald E. Hall ed., 2012).  
  28.  ARUDOU, JAPANĪZU ONRĪ, supra note 27; ARUDOU, JAPANESE ONLY, supra note 27; 
ARUDOU, EMBEDDED RACISM, supra note 27. 
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A. Case in Point: Weiner’s Japan’s Minorities 
To demonstrate what these “blind spots” do to otherwise sound 
research, let us focus on an influential book in this field: Michael Weiner’s 
Japan’s Minorities.29 Weiner’s introduction refers to Japan’s “principal 
minority populations” specifically as Ainu, Koreans, Burakumin, Chinese, 
Okinawans, and Nikkei South Americans.30 Although indeed minorities in 
Japan, note that they are not Visible Minorities, in that they are generally 
of “Asian” roots and can “pass” as “Japanese” in many social interactions, 
including the veto gate at Otaru’s Yunohana.31 Although Weiner’s second 
edition includes a new chapter by John Russell on “Blacks” in Japan and 
their “otherness,” Blacks are neither included under Weiner’s “principal 
minority population” nor made a part of the non-Asian minority 
population in Japan.32  
This raises the question: What of the people of darker skins or 
differently-colored physical characteristics? In a book covering racial and 
ethnic discrimination in Japan, there is no reference either to the Ana 
Bortz Case (1998–99 or Otaru Hot Springs Case (1993–2005), two 
significant lawsuits that determined the Japanese judiciary’s position on 
the constitutionality of racial discrimination (jinshu sabetsu) in Japan. 
Instead, Weiner argues that Japan, unlike other nations, has been able to 
carry on racism “without reference to the colour stigmata” 33  (which 
logically should have precluded the Russell chapter on “Blacks”). After 
more than two decades of influx of visually-distinct migrant/immigrant 
laborers, increased international marriage, and unprecedented levels of 
“Newcomer” Permanent Residents, it is an oversight of scholarship to 
omit examples of racialized stigmata repeatedly certified in Japan’s 
judiciary.  
Other scholars in Weiner’s book, even when acknowledging color 
stigmata in Japan, tend to overlook or downplay the racialization process 
both interpersonally and in the public policy arena. For example, Robert 
Fish in his section on “mixed-blood Japanese” offers an excellent 
overview of the national debate on how children of American soldiers in 
Japan during The Occupation (1945–52) were to be “treated” as they 
 
 
 29.  JAPAN’S MINORITIES: THE ILLUSION OF HOMOGENEITY (Michael Weiner ed., 2d ed. 2009). 
 30.  Michael Weiner, Introduction to THE ILLUSION OF HOMOGENEITY, at xvii (Michael Weiner 
ed., 2d ed. 2009). 
 31. ARUDOU, JAPANESE ONLY, supra note 27, at 14–45. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. at xiv. 
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reached school age in Japan—i.e., as official objects of pity, as “cute,”34 or 
as potential bullying cases in school that required attention for special 
policies for proper care and assimilation. However, Fish states that this is 
not a racialization process, saying “‘race,’ per se, did not create consistent 
problems for students.”35 Instead, he argues inter alia that the behavior of 
the students themselves was to blame: “Overwhelmingly, the children who 
had difficulties in school had extreme difficulties in their home life, and 
those who found themselves isolated often behaved in relatively antisocial 
ways that would have created problems for the children regardless of 
physical appearance.”36 He cites Ministry of Education data that much of 
the bullying was “because of their rough personalities,”37 or due to socio-
economic issues, such as parental connections with Japan’s sex trades, or 
being raised by single mothers with unstable father figures.38 Fish also 
claims Japan was in fact “ahead of the curve at actively encouraging 
equality”39 compared to, for example, the contemporary United States with 
segregation.  
However, this demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
racialization processes in every society. What of the perennial and cyclical 
bullying problems (still in existence today) that drive enormous numbers 
of students to mental illness and suicide in Japan? 40  What of the 
“microaggressions” that alienate, psychologically drain, and grind people 
down because they are seen as “different”? 41  Could these constant 
alienations and “otherings” conceivably be the cause of the “rough 
personalities,” not an effect? Regarding Fish’s comparison with the United 
States, I agree that the element of “hypodescent” in the American example 
(e.g., Plessy vs. Ferguson, and the “one drop rule,” meaning a person who 
 
 
 34.  Robert Fish,“Mixed-blood” Japanese: A Reconsideration of Race and Purity in Japan, in 
JAPAN’S MINORITIES: THE ILLUSION OF HOMOGENITY 40, 48 (Michael Weiner ed., 2d ed. 2009). 
 35.  Id. at 55. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. at 54. 
 38.  Id. at 51–52. 
 39.  Id. at 53. 
 40. See Brian J. McVeigh, Education Reform in Japan: Fixing Education or Fostering Economic 
Nation-statism?, in GLOBALIZATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 76, 76–92 (J.S. 
Eades, Tom Gill, & Harumi Befu eds., 2000). See also Jeff Kingston, Exploring the Pathologies of 
Japan’s Youth, JAPAN TIMES (May 20, 2012), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/culture/2012/05/20/books/ 
book-reviews/exploring-the-pathologies-of-japans-youth/#.VYI20_lViko (reviewing A SOCIOLOGY OF 
JAPANESE YOUTH: FROM RETURNEES TO NEETS (Roger Goodman, Yuki Imoto, & Tuukka Toivonen 
eds., 2012)).  
 41. Derald W. Sue & David Rivera, Racial Microaggressions in Everyday Life, PSYCHOLOGY 
TODAY, (Oct. 5, 2010), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/microaggressions-in-everyday-life/ 
201010/racial-microaggressions-in-everyday-life.  
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had one drop of African-descent blood was classified as a “black person”) 
was not present in Japan’s policymaking—“mixed-blood” children were 
still officially “Japanese” in public policy.42 However, is the existence of 
racism in a society thus deniable when it is allegedly less pronounced in 
that society than in other societies?  
What Fish overlooks is Japan’s policymaking process of embedding 
racism through “typifying race.” That is to say, how the acceptance and 
normalization of differentiation (i.e., the assumption that “mixed-blood 
children” are different because they look different) in fact legitimizes and 
systematizes racism (this is why scholars of racism generally do not use 
generic racialized categorizations such as “Black”, “White”, “Asian” etc. 
without proper problematization and contextualization). In fact, as argued 
earlier, the racialization process need not involve biological “race” at all: 
the act of differentiating, “othering,” and subordinating can be due to any 
physical marker that has a social stigma attached to it (e.g., hair textures, 
narrower eyes, cleft palates, skin blemishes). Notwithstanding the 
Japanese government’s (constructive) postwar attempts to enforce equality 
for “mixed-blood children” at the Japanese elementary school level, the 
fact that “mixed-blood children” were officially categorized, “othered,” 
and singled out for differential treatment on an official level in fact invited 
more attention to the issue of blood in Japanese society. 43  In effect, 
especially in an atmosphere of impressionable youths like a schoolyard, 
this typification could in fact have created and reinforced mixed-
bloodedness as a stigma, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy that 
encouraged the very racialization that government policies were trying to 
avoid. Thus the sociology of racism itself should have been more fully 
problematized and discussed in Fish’s research.  
I would argue that Visible Minorities are the “canary in the coal mine” 
regarding Japan’s openness to “outsiders.” This research will now take the 
first steps to outline the contours of Japan’s racialization dynamic, 
showing how Japan’s structuralized social patterns contain racialization 
processes so embedded in space and time that they contribute to the 
differentiation, “othering,” and subordination of people by phenotype, 
even when it is detrimental to Japanese society as a whole. 
 
 
  42. See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM 
THE 1960S TO THE 1990S (1986); Cynthia L. Nakashima, An Invisible Monster: The Creation and 
Denial of Mixed-Race People in America, in RACIALLY MIXED PEOPLE IN AMERICA 162, 162–80 
(Maria P.P. Root ed., 1992).  
 43. Robert A. Fisk, “Mixed-blood” Japanese: A Reconsideration of Race and Purity in Japan, in 
JAPAN’S MINORITIES: THE ILLUSION OF HOMOGENEITY 40, 42 (Michael Weiner ed., 2d ed. 2009).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss4/13
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III. JAPAN’S RACIALIZATION DYNAMIC 
A. “Looking Japanese”: The Importance of Skin Color 
Although it is difficult to quantify specifically how one “looks 
Japanese” (e.g., skin color, shape of epicanthic fold of the eye, contours of 
facial features (rinkaku), acculturated behaviors, fashion sense, etc.), the 
dynamic of how physical appearance fundamentally defines membership 
in racialized societies is well researched even in the canon of Japanese 
Studies.44 Notions of “Self” in a society are crafted by sociological factors 
without a great deal of individual agency, and are fundamental in deciding 
who becomes part of the “Other.” Skin color in Japan, as in all societies 
that make visual distinctions between people depending on melanin 
content, is a defining factor as to how one “looks Japanese.”45 One skin 
tone that is held in high social esteem in Japan is Whiteness.46 According 
to Ashikari, in her study of the material culture of the Japanese cosmetics 
industry, argues that skin is an avenue for conveying “Japaneseness,” 
because Japan’s middle class believes that “Japanese as a race share the 
same skin tone, and the notion of Japanese skin works as one medium to 
express and represent Japaneseness.”47 Being “white” is a common symbol 
of culturally-valued “purity” and “cleanliness,” thus lighter skin is 
preferable to darker as it looks “cleaner,” meaning darker skin is 
considered “less Japanese.”48 Although the material culture of Japanese 
cosmetics and fashion reproduces and reinforces this high value towards 
 
 
  44. Cf. Mikiko Ashikari, Cultivating Japanese Whiteness: The ‘Whitening’ Cosmetics Boom and 
the Japanese Identity, 10 J. MATERIAL CULTURE 73, 73–91 (2005); CLAMMER, supra note 13; EIJI 
OGUMA, TAN’ITSU MINZOKU SHINWA NO KIGEN (1995); Sabine Frühstück, Treating the Body as a 
Commodity: “Body Projects” in Contemporary Japan, in CONSUMPTION AND MATERIAL CULTURE IN 
CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 143–48 (Michael Ashkenazi & John Clammer eds., 2000); Richard M. Siddle, 
The Ainu: Indigenous people of Japan, in JAPAN’S MINORITIES: THE ILLUSION OF HOMOGENEITY 
(Michael Weiner ed., 1st ed. 1997); JAPAN’S MINORITIES: THE ILLUSION OF HOMOGENEITY (Michael 
Weiner ed., 1st ed. 1997); KŌSAKU YOSHINO, CULTURAL NATIONALISM IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 
115–21 (1992); Kōsaku Yoshino, The Discourse on Blood and Racial Identity in Contemporary Japan, 
in THE CONSTRUCTION OF RACIAL IDENTITIES IN CHINA AND JAPAN 199, 199–211 (Frank Dikötter ed., 
1997).  
 45. Cf. YOSHINO, CULTURAL NATIONALISM IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN, supra note 44, at 115–
21.  
 46. Id.  
 47. Ashikari, supra note 44, at 79. 
  48. Id. See also, e.g., Jöel Assogba, Book is behind bullying of mixed-race children, JAPAN 
TIMES (Apr. 10, 2012), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2012/04/10/voices/book-is-behind-
bullying-of-mixed-race-children/; Rotem Kowner & Walter Demel, Modern East Asia and the Rise of 
Racial Thought: Possible Links, Unique Features and Unsettle Issues, in RACE AND RACISM IN 
MODERN EAST ASIA: WESTERN AND EASTERN CONSTRUCTIONS 20–21 (Rotem Kowner & Walter 
Demel eds., 2012).  
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lightness and beauty, there is a racial component: “the preference for white 
skin, which is linked to a massive consumer culture, appears to be a matter 
of both beauty and race.”49  
Sterling might concur, noting that the omnipresence and normalization 
of “Whiteness” (in contrast to the “objectification” of Blackness) in 
Japanese society has perhaps “made it possible to miss the presence of 
racial thinking in Japan.” 50  This conceit may explain why so much 
emphasis has been placed upon a Japanese self-image as “Caucasian”, as 
seen in the historical “body projects” for the “improvement of the 
[Japanese] race” via interbreeding with Occidentals, and the “ideal body” 
as “Western.”51 It may be used to substantiate theories that the Japanese 
are in fact, among other far-flung peoples, “Aryan”—given that 
contemporary historical rankings of the “races” (cf. ‘social Darwinism”) 
put White people on top.52 It may also explain why Japan lobbied for (and 
received) “honorary white” status in Apartheid South Africa.53  
Let us now turn our attention to the historical roots of the performative 
aspect of Japan’s racialization paradigms: 
B. Historical Roots of Japan’s Racialized Approach to “Outsiders” as a 
Colonizer 
Much research on “race” and its conceits in Japan has focused on how 
Western concepts of racism were exported to Asia, due to contact with and 
replication/fetishization of “foreignness” in Japan’s mass media or 
subcultures, or due to the influences on Japan being a colonial power.54 As 
 
 
 49. Ashikari, supra note 44, at 76.  
 50. MARVIN D. STERLING, BABYLON EAST: PERFORMING DANCEHALL, ROOTS REGGAE, AND 
RASTAFARI IN JAPAN 25 (2010).  
 51.  See, e.g., EIJI OGUMA, A GENEALOGY OF “JAPANESE” SELF-IMAGES 143–55 (2002); Sabine 
Frühstück, Treating the Body as a Commodity: “Body Projects” in Contemporary Japan, in 
CONSUMPTION AND MATERIAL CULTURE IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 143–48 (Michael Ashkenazi & 
John Clammer eds., 2000); Id. at 144; John Russell, The Other Other: The Black Presence in the 
Japanese Experience, in JAPAN’S MINORITIES: THE ILLUSIONS OF HOMOGENEITY 84, 97 (Michael 
Weiner ed., 2d ed. 2009).  
 52. See Frühstück supra note 51, at 147–48. 
 53. Masako Osada, Sanctions and Honorary Whites: Domestic Policies and Economic Realities, 
in RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND SOUTH AFRICA (2002). 
  54. See, e.g., THE CONSTRUCTION OF RACIAL IDENTITIES IN CHINA AND JAPAN (Frank Dikötter 
ed., 1997); Hiroshi Wagatsuma, The Social Perception of Skin color in Japan, 96 DAEDALUS 407, 
407–43 (1967); HIROSHI WAGATSUMA & GEORGE DEVOS, JAPAN’S INVISIBLE RACE: CASTE IN 
CULTURE AND PERSONALITY (1966); TAYLOR E. ATKINS, BLUE NIPPON: AUTHENTICATING JAZZ IN 
JAPAN (2001); IAN CONDRY, HIP-HOP JAPAN (2006); KAREN KELSKY, WOMEN ON THE VERGE: 
JAPANESE WOMEN, WESTERN DREAMS (2001); John G. Russell, Race and Reflexivity: The Black 
Other in Contemporary Japanese Mass Culture, 6 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 3, 3–25 (1991); 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss4/13
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Koshiro notes, “the Japanese colonial empire operated within its own 
racial constructions.”55 However, I wish to focus more on how racism in 
Japan is more endogenous than exogenous, having been created and 
replicated at the structural level through Japan’s construction of nation-
state narrative and national policymaking. Gluck has noted how Meiji 
Japan used “foreigners” (including the metaphorical sense) as a perpetual 
means of contrast to justify its national unification and catch-up 
industrialization programs.56 Its programs for “modernizing” as a nation-
state and industrial power were based upon contemporary Western models 
of education that created and promoted notions of citizenship as a civic 
duty, fostered a media to constantly reify it, and constructed a military-
industrial complex to enrich and protect it.57 Regarding national narratives, 
Gluck uses the term “modern myths” to describe the discourses 
implemented to define and unite the “Japanese people” behind an imperial 
system that at its core defined itself in contrast with the outsider; even 
social deviance and other thoughts inimical to current State goals (such as 
individuality and socialism) were attributed to being “foreign” (as in, 
significantly, “not Japanese”), thereby discounted or excluded. 58 
Furthermore, Sterling notes that “Japan’s very birth as a nation was largely 
defined by the adoption of Western institutions and ideologies—including 
racial ones—that remain with Japan even today.” 59  As Dikötter notes: 
“Racial discourse. . . in Japan thrived and evolved over time because it 
reconfigured pre-existing notions of identity and simultaneously appealed 
to a variety of groups, from popular audiences to groups of scientists.”60 
Let us first apply one of these “modern myths” to later Meiji-Era 
Japan, when Japan’s goal of industrialization under a unified Japanese 
state was expanded and adapted to incorporate colonization of non-
 
 
RUSSELL supra note 51; STERLING supra note 50. For a discussion of the influence of colonialism see, 
e.g., Kevin Doak, Building National Identity through Ethnicity: Ethnology in Wartime Japan and 
After, 27 J. JAPANESE STUDIES 1, 1–39 (2001); Robert Eskildsen, Of Civilization and Savages: The 
Mimetic Imperialism of Japan’s 1874 Expedition to Taiwan, 107 AM. HISTORICAL REV. 388, 388–418 
(2002); Mariko Asano Tamanoi, Knowledge, Power, and Racial Classification: The “Japanese” in 
“Manchuria” 59 J. ASIAN STUDIES, 248, 248–76 (2000); MICHAEL WEINER, RACE AND MIGRATION IN 
IMPERIAL JAPAN (1994).  
 55. See Yukiko Koshiro, East Asia’s “Melting Pot”: Re-evaluating Race Relations in Japan’s 
Colonial Empire, in RACE AND RACISM IN MODERN EAST ASIA 475 (Rotem Kowner & Walter Demel 
eds., 2012).  
 56. See CAROL GLUCK, JAPAN’S MODERN MYTHS: IDEOLOGY IN THE LATE MEIJI PERIOD 38–39, 
135 (1985).  
  57.  Id. 
 58. Id. at 38.  
 59. See STERLING, supra note 50, at 24.  
 60. See THE CONSTRUCTION OF RACIAL IDENTITIES IN CHINA AND JAPAN, supra note 54, at 8.  
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Japanese under a unified Japanese empire. There is a common belief held 
both inside and outside of Japan that Japan’s “insular spirit” (shimaguni 
konjō) and “homogeneous race” (tan”itsu minzoku) has existed “from time 
immemorial”, due to Japan’s ocean-bounded geography and political 
isolation (sakoku) during its Tokugawa Era (1603–1868). 61  However, 
abundant scholarship demonstrates that Japan’s insular homogeneity 
narrative was a Post-WWII creation.62 As per the nation-state building 
process, there was the need to unify the people under a shared history and 
imagined communality (in Japan’s case, behind the Emperor myth).63 But 
when Japan became a colonial power between 1905 and 1945, it advocated 
a “multicultural, hybrid” model, in order to proclaim a universalist 
approach towards the Asian brethren it wished to colonize. 64  Koshiro 
writes, “The Japanese as colonial masters also understood that they were 
not a “pure” race but rather an amalgam of races of Asia and the 
Pacific.”65 Oguma notes that Japan even claimed, in contrast to the other 
colonial powers in the early 20th Century, that it was ideologically unable 
to practice racial discrimination because it was unifying its neighboring 
brethren of the same Asian race (as opposed to the Europeans, who were 
colonizing faraway places of non-White peoples).66 Japan, ironically, as 
the first non-White imperial power, was the first country in the League of 
Nations to advocate a proposal for a racial equality clause in its Covenant 
(1919), albeit unsuccessfully.67 
 
 
 61. See THE INVENTION OF TRADITION 2 (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., 1983). See 
also BEFU, supra note 17.  
 62. Cf. OGUMA, supra note 51 and JAPAN’S MINORITIES: THE ILLUSION OF HOMOGENEITY 
(Michael Weiner ed., 2d ed. 2009).  
 63. Cf. OGUMA, supra note 44; GLUCK, supra note 56. 
 64. See YUMIKO IIDA, RETHINKING IDENTITY IN MODERN JAPAN 142–43 (2002); OGUMA, supra 
note 44; SVEN SAALER & J. VICTOR KOSCHMANN, PAN-ASIANISM IN MODERN JAPANESE HISTORY: 
COLONIALISM, REGIONALISM, AND BORDERS 6–14 (2007); Hwaji Shin, Colonial Legacy of Ethno-
racial Inequality in Japan, 39 J. THEORY & SOC’Y 327 (2010). 
 65. Koshiro, supra note 55, at 476. 
 66. OGUMA, supra note 44, at 332–33. Fujitani also put it eloquently when he noted how 
Koreans within the Japanese Empire faced a rhetoric that was a transformation in the type of racist 
discrimination . . . a movement from what might be called an unabashed and exclusionary ‘vulgar 
racism’ to a new type and inclusionary and ‘polite racism’ that denied itself as racism even as it 
operated as such. Fujitani Takashi, Right to Kill, Right to Make Live: Koreans as Japanese and 
Japanese as Americans during WWII 99, REPRESENTATIONS 17, 33 (2007). 
 67. Cf. PAUL GORDON LAUREN, POWER AND PREJUDICE: THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF 
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (1988); REGINALD KEARNEY, AFRICAN AMERICAN VIEWS OF JAPANESE: 
SOLIDARITY OR SEDITION? (1998); see THE CONSTRUCTION OF RACIAL IDENTITIES IN CHINA AND 
JAPAN, supra note 54. Even then, as Russell notes, “[Japan’s] rhetoric of racial equality left much to be 
desired, for not only did Japan’s racial equality clause not question the right of League members to 
possess colonies (at the time Japan was also seeking [a new colony in China]) but its demand for “fair 
and equal treatment” applied only to “civilized nations” (bunmei koku) and League member states—
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol14/iss4/13
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C. Japan’s Historical Roots of Social Hierarchy and Skin Color 
However, as Oguma et al. note, the fundamentals of Japan’s unequal 
approach towards outsiders was still extant even under the universalist, 
anti-racism official stances. For example, Fukuzawa Yūkichi, a Meiji-Era 
intellectual (currently gracing Japan’s ¥10,000 note) with great influence 
over Japan’s development as an imperial power, wrote An Outline of a 
Theory of Civilization (Bunmei-ron no Gairyaku, 1875). 68  Within it, 
Fukuzawa borrowed from contemporary Western eugenics science on 
racial hierarchies while diverging from the classical definition of 
“civilization” to offer an updated, static concept including a spiritual 
element, i.e., one where a society attains “both material well-being and the 
elevation of the human spirit . . . abundance of daily necessities and 
esteem for human refinement.”69 Fukuzawa also offered Japan’s nascent 
Post-Feudal society (a time when Japanese systems for universal literacy 
and tertiary education were being established) an overall political purpose: 
establishing a Japan that could deal with the outside world on its own 
terms. Outline was an argument for societies as a whole to emulate and 
learn from more “civilized” lands, in this case a model upon which Japan 
would create a sovereign nation-state.70  
However, undergirding Fukuzawa’s philosophy was a racial 
component. He couches his analysis of social behavior in terms of skin 
color, for example, “young men of the Caucasian race (persons of white 
skin),” with hierarchical rankings. According to Fukuzawa, societies 
composed of “persons of white skin” (i.e., the United States and Europe) 
were at the highest stage of fully-developed “civilization,” followed by 
Asian countries (‘semi-civilized” (hankai), e.g., Turkey, China, and Japan, 
with Japan ranked highest), and at the bottom (“barbaric” (yaban)) were 
people of dark skin, such as Africans or Australian aborigines. 71  This 
 
 
not to their colonies and subject peoples. Japan’s ruling elites were less interested in securing equality 
for non-whites than in ensuring that Japan, as a sovereign nation and member of the League, would be 
afforded the same privileges as Western nations . . .” see Russell, supra note 51. 
 68. YUKICHI FUKUZAWA: AN OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF CIVILIZATION (David A. Dilworth 
trans., 2009); see Russell, supra note 51. 
 69. Fukuzawa borrowed from Western eugenics: see Russell, supra note 51, at 95; see YUKICHI 
FUKUZAWA, supra note 68, at 42. Regarding the concept of “civilization,” the classical definition of it 
to writers of this time period probably meant a society with a written language—as seen in the very 
word for “civilization” (bunmei) in Chinese and later Japanese, with characters meaning “clear 
script”—through which its history is recorded for posterity (cf. Webster’s Dictionary et al.). 
 70. See FUKUZAWA, supra note 68, at xv and xxv. 
 71. For more information on skin color and herarchical ranking, see FUKUZAWA, supra note 68, 
at 57. This hierarchy is claimed to continue into present-day Japanese society, with the ranking as 
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philosophy, grounded in imported Western science, justified not only a 
further “othering” of minorities but also the assimilation of “lesser” 
peoples. As Russell notes, “The ascription of barbarity, backwardness and 
squalor to Japan’s minorities served these ambitions [of a forging of 
national identity] well, since it not only confirmed the relative closeness of 
Japan to the West but also provided Japanese with a civilizing mission of 
their own, one that aimed both to elevate the primitive Other and 
themselves as well.” 72  These racialization and subordination processes 
were seen as a means to reproduce the conditions that were presumed 
necessary by Japan’s Meiji oligarchs for a rise to power as seen in the 
West.73 
Fukuzawa’s memes of racialized hierarchy and mission were soon 
visible within Japan’s empire.74 People within Japan’s colonies (Taiwan, 
Korea, and later parts of China, Russia, and Oceania) faced a very uneven 
approach to their legal status within Japan.75 For example, during Japan’s 
administration of their societies, Koreans, Chinese, and Taiwanese were 
considered Japanese subjects with Japanese citizenship. 76  They were 
granted certain Japanese-citizen privileges, such as the option to reside and 
work in Japan indefinitely without a visa (notwithstanding those who 
came to Japan or its colonies as forced laborers) and to serve in the 
Japanese military. 77  These were not full Japanese subject privileges, 
however. Taiwanese and Koreans did not, for example, have the right to 
 
 
“Western/Asian/Black/guest worker/Nikkeijin” (see CLAMMER, supra note 13), with Japan in second 
place below “Western” but above “Asian,” see BEFU, supra note 17.  
 72. See Russell, supra note 51, at 95. See also Fish, supra note 34, at 43. 
 73. See Russell, supra note 51, at 96. 
 74. A thorough history of Japan’s linkage of nationality and ethno-national identity, and how it 
differs from the European colonial experience, may be found in Kashiwazaki. See Kashiwazaki, supra 
note 15. A thorough history of how case-by-case bureaucratic reactions to individual foreign 
applicants for Japanese naturalization (before provisions were formally encoded in Japan’s Nationality 
Law) may be found in Asakawa (2007), with particular emphasis on the precedent-setting treatment of 
“foreign” residents in the newly-annexed Ogasawara Islands in 1878. See ASAKA, supra note 18. 
 75. Cf. THE JAPANESE COLONIAL EMPIRE 1895–1945 (Ramon H. Myers & Mark R. Peattie eds., 
1987); see generally LEO T. S. CHING, BECOMING JAPANESE: COLONIAL TAIWAN AND THE POLITICS 
OF IDENTITY FORMATION (2001). 
 76. See The Japanese Colonial Empire, supra note 75; Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Borderline Japan: 
Foreigners and Frontier Controls in the Postwar Era (2010). 
 77. See CHING, supra note 75; OGUMA, supra note 44, at 321–41; Chen notes: “Holding virtual 
monopoly of higher positions in the colonial government [of Taiwan and Korea] and managerial and 
skilled positions in colonial finance and industry, [Japanese] opposed integration, fearing that it would 
eventually wipe out the political and economic advantages they enjoyed. To protect their interests, 
Japanese turned to the colonial government, a move which often resorted to such measures that could 
only be construed as a thinly disguised form of racial discrimination.” Edward I-te Chen, The Attempt 
to Integrate the Empire: Legal Perspectives, in THE JAPANESE COLONIAL EMPIRE 1895–1945 273 
(Ramon H. Myers & Mark R. Peattie eds., 1987). 
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move their Family Registry (honseki) to Japan Proper (naichi), vote their 
own colonial representatives to the Diet, create their own legislatures, 
standing militaries, or police forces, or administratively become an 
additional prefecture of Japan as, for example, Hokkaidō did.78 Although 
eventually the express goal of colonization was full assimilation (dōka), 
Japan’s fifty years as a colonial power was perhaps insufficient time for 
the colonizer to overcome the reflexive self-preservation of their privilege 
over the colonized, experience an “interest convergence” (such as a civil 
war) that would compel colonizer to cede privileges to the colonized, or 
develop a concept of the colonized as having equal rights as the 
colonizer.79 Further, this colonial experience would establish a template 
for systematic treatment of “others” and foreigners (including the 
 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. Oguma would probably argue that equality between Japanese and colonial subjects would not 
have happened under any circumstances, since Japan’s concept of “brotherly relations” was built upon 
hierarchical concepts within the Ie Seido (Family System). OGUMA, supra note 44, at 334–41. Under 
this hierarchy, Japanese would reserve the “elder brother” status (with near-absolute rights of family 
title, inheritance, etc.) whereas the “younger brother” colony would be subordinated, waiting for a 
theoretical equality that would in reality never come (this is, of course, where the “family” metaphor 
breaks down, as people are more mortal than nation-states, meaning the power relations are perpetual). 
Id. at 338–39. Oguma cites an illustrative speech from the Korean Governor-General Minami Jirō 
dated 1942 to a Korean audience, when he was advocating Korean conscription in the Japanese war 
effort. Oguma notes that Koreans expected the trade-off would be political enfranchisement in return 
for possibly sacrificing their lives for the Empire. However, Minami was clear that demanding one’s 
rights was a “selfish” Western conceit, anathema to the essence of being loyal imperial subjects:  
 Generally speaking, the essence of imperial subjects is fundamentally different from the 
Western belief that one should ‘start” by demanding one’s rights. All imperial subjects are 
part of a great family that consists of a single sovereign (ikkun banmin), where the 
relationship is that between liege and lord but where the emotional ties are those of a father 
and his children. In interacting with the family head, family members do not talk in terms of 
rights and obligations. Rather, the elder brother acts as befits an elder brother, while the 
younger brother acts as befits a younger brother. It is natural and fundamental that all should 
cooperate in harmony to help the family flourish and move up in the world.  
 In any family, parents look forward to their children growing up and, when they are old 
enough, they take all the steps that are needed to ensure that they are educated. This is a 
consequence of the parents feelings and love. It is not the custom in Japanese families for 
children to start ranting about their right to an education simply because they are old enough 
to attend school. Those who shamelessly practice what is not the custom in Japanese families 
are delinquents, and it must be said that this in and of itself disqualifies them from becoming 
imperial subjects. 
Id. Thus the political dimension of the “nation as family” structure is quite clear: The child never 
becomes a “father” (because the father never dies), and the child’s expecting a say (or even raising the 
very question about a say) in the way “the family” is run is neither “loyal” nor even “Japanese.” It was 
a perpetual status of differentiation and subordination based upon borders delineated under Japan’s 
nation-state, and, despite Japan’s “brotherhood” rhetoric, was at the core anti-equality and 
performatively racializing. GLUCK, supra note 46, at 189. 
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newfound “foreigners” as Japan shed its empire) during the immediate 
Postwar Era and beyond.80 
D. Postwar Decolonization and the New “Homogeneous Japan” 
Discourse  
In the immediate years following Japan’s defeat in WWII and under 
the eye of the U.S. Occupation (hereinafter SCAP, for Supreme Command 
Allied Powers), McVeigh et al. note how American reforms of Japan left 
essential parts of nation-state generating apparatus fundamentally 
unaltered, due to the exigencies of smooth bureaucratic maintenance of 
public order, and due to the contemporary political vicissitudes ensuring 
Japan did not fall into the Communist Bloc after revolutions in China and 
North Korea.81 Crucial to Japan’s future was the status of education of 
Japan’s youth, and McVeigh pays particular attention to “educational 
nationalism.”82 SCAP’s failure to fundamentally reform the Ministry of 
Education (Monbushō) allowed an extremely-centralized “monopoly of 
legitimate education” to promote exclusivist notions of “Japaneseness.”83 
Establishing the hegemony of Japan’s “homogeneous society” national 
narrative from primary school age, and then leaving it fundamentally 
unreformed to the present day, McVeigh portrays the Postwar regime of 
inculcated “Japaneseness” as a “stealth ideology,” one with unclear goals 
and concepts, yet so pervasive that it became hard to see other alternatives 
in Japanese society.  
The “Japaneseness” described by McVeigh merges three types of 
national identity—“ethnocultural, statist, and racial”—into “habitual and 
unconscious sentiments” that became tautological and mutually-defining.84 
Simply put: “The merging of these concepts forms a logic of tautological 
equivalencies: ‘one looks Japanese because one is ethnically Japanese 
because one possesses Japanese citizenship’” (emphasis mine). 85  This 
phenotypically-based requirement for national membership in Japanese 
society would thus become an inescapable doctrine for the overwhelming 
majority of people living in Japan, because compulsory education in Japan 
is fundamental to social mobility, acculturation, and even normatively 
 
 
 80. OGUMA, supra note 44; Shin, supra note 64, at 327. 
 81. McVeigh, supra note 40. 
 82. Id. at 78. 
 83. Monopoly of legitimate education: ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 34 
(1983).  
 84. McVeigh, supra note 40, at 89–92. 
 85. Id. at 90. 
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being seen as a “good Japanese.”86 Fukuoka would probably agree, as he 
uses Japanese schooling as a qualification for “Japaneseness” in his 
scholarship (more below).87 
That was how “good Japanese” were to be socially conditioned as part 
of the ‘self” in Postwar Japan. However, regarding the “Other,” the 
Postwar Japanese Government (GOJ) enacted policies that would 
perpetually influence its policy towards “foreign” residents.88 First, under 
the terms of surrender, former Imperial subjects in Japan’s colonies lost 
their Japanese citizenship. 89  Under pressure from SCAP, Japan gave 
former subjects (seen as potential enemy nationals under emerging Cold-
War polarities) who were still within Japan’s borders a choice: (a) to 
return to their homelands as non-Japanese or (b) go through the (often 
humiliating) process of naturalization to become Japanese citizens. 90 
Historians differ as to whether Japan ‘stripped” citizenship from or 
enforced a “voluntary de-naturalization” upon its former colonists, or 
whether it was a matter of “lapsing out of an ambiguous state,” due to the 
terms of the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty, and a lack of mutual 
recognition of the rights of sovereign nationalities.91 In either case, only 
Japanese of “Japanese blood” (from a Japanese male) were permitted to 
retain their Japanese citizenship after WWII (with the exception of 
 
 
 86. Id. at 91–92. 
 87. FUKUOKA, supra note 14.  
 88. Shin, supra note 64. 
 89. MORRIS-SUZUKI, supra note 76; THE JAPANESE COLONIAL EMPIRE, supra note 75; see 
generally CHING, supra note 75. 
 90. Pressure from SCAP: Shin, supra note 64, at 328. Humiliating naturalization processes: Cf. 
MORRIS-SUZUKI, supra note 76; and the author’s own experience with naturalization 1997–2000. 
 91. Historians differ: cf. YUJI IWASAWA, INTERNATIONAL LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS AND JAPANESE 
LAW: THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON JAPANESE LAW (1998); Levin, supra note 12, at 500; 
OGUMA, supra note 44, at 341; Shin, supra note 64. Lack of mutual recognition: Nantais 
(forthcoming) would argue that the “othering” of Japan’s Non-Japanese former imperial subjects was 
not entirely due to the Japanese government. Barely two months after the Japanese surrender and 
American Occupation, the former imperial subjects, as sangokujin, were already designated (under 
SCAP’s JCS 1380/15, November 3, 1945) as “liberated peoples,” therefore not Japanese, but they 
were given the choice of being “repatriated” as foreigners or remaining in Japan as enemy nationals. 
Many of the sangokujin chose to side with the victors and receive preferential treatment, driving 
wedges that would be exploited by Japanese in authority when the Occupation ended. However, with 
the onset of the Cold War in China and the Korean Peninsula, the Occupation’s view dramatically 
shifted to view sangokujin as potential communist “subversives;” this intensified SCAP’s push for 
“repatriation,” which was problematic until the sangokujin had their status of registered Japanese 
national formally removed. That was accomplished by the GOJ by 1950, shortly before the Occupation 
ended, although the “repatriation” remained voluntary: the Zainichi were still allowed to voluntarily 
remain in Japan—as non-citizens—instead of being forcefully sent “home” to war-torn lands. Nantais, 
supra note 14.  
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aborigines within Japan’s current sovereign borders, i.e., the Ainu of 
Hokkaidō; and later the Ryūkyūans of Okinawa).92 
This in fact made the postwar narrative of “homogeneous Japan” easier 
to accomplish. 93  Intellectuals and policymakers stressed the need for 
Japan’s “reconstruction” by demolishing Japan’s former colonial 
tendencies, enabling the government to “reinforce their exclusionary 
policy against the colonial immigrants during their democratic 
transition.”94 Thus the ethnically-hybrid Pan-Asian empire narrative was 
quickly replaced by an ethnically-homogeneous one. According to Shin, 
“This postwar self-image in turn justified their further exclusion and 
discrimination against their remaining colonial subjects.”95 New national 
polices established foreign registry systems for all resident non-nationals 
to track their whereabouts as “foreigners” (1947, put into effect in 1952), 
with measures that were not otherwise enforced upon law-abiding 
Japanese citizens: e.g., fingerprinting and identification cards that to the 
present day must be carried at all times under criminal penalty, enabling 
lawful police identity checks that did not require probable cause.96 This 
would set the agenda for future treatment of all “foreigners” and “migrant 
workers” to Japan, controlling possible future choices both for 
policymakers and for incoming foreign residents of Japan.97 
E. Postwar Invisible and Visible Minorities in Japan: Scholarly “Blind 
Spots” Emerge 
Japan has long claimed that there are no “minorities” (shōsū minzoku) 
at all within its borders, and for a long period of its history did not see 
“race” (jinshu) as the ultracentrifuge of human classification.98 Scholarship 
on Japan shared this view: 
According to Fish, during the worldwide expansion of empires through 
the Tokugawa Era, conceits regarding issues of “race” were not of the 
“light/dark” polarity, but rather of the “we Japanese/others” binary, i.e., 
who is “Japanese” and who is not. Phenotype-based racism, according to 
Fish, was exogenous, coming from the Western Enlightenment and the 
 
 
 92. MORRIS-SUZUKI, supra note 76; THE JAPANESE COLONIAL EMPIRE, supra note 75; see 
generally CHING, supra note 75. 
 93. OGUMA, supra note 44; Shin, supra note 64. 
 94. Shin, supra note 64, at 328. 
 95. Id. 
  96. See ARUDOU, EMBEDDED RACISM, supra note 27, at chapter 5. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at chapter 8. 
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intellectual need to categorize and classify everything. 99  According to 
Fish, during the Meiji (1868–1912), Taishō (1912–1926), and early Shōwa 
(1926–1989) Eras, this would change little: People adjudged as “mixed 
blood” (konketsu, defined as “people who appear to be the offspring of one 
parent of East Asian origin and one parent of non-East Asian origin”100) 
belonged at the time to well-regarded classes (e.g., children of 
missionaries, leading businessmen, teachers and scholars), and were small 
in number so as to have little need to be “othered.”101 
However, it should be noted that there were other less visually-
identifiable (therefore “invisible”) minorities being brought into the 
Japanese empire, who were nonetheless being treated significantly 
differently. As mentioned above, during Japan’s Meiji-Era Imperial 
expansion, Japan’s colonized peoples were officially seen as fellow 
members of the same Japanese race under Pan-Asian tenets of Asian 
brotherhood. But people who were not considered part of the group of 
“dominant Japanese,” be they a historical underclass (the Burakumin), 
citizens of empire (e.g., Koreans, Taiwanese, or Chinese) or indigenous 
peoples of new Japanese territory (the Ainu and Ryūkyūans), were under 
government policy to be assimilated (dōka) into cultural invisibility—or 
even isolated and eradicated (e.g., native Formosans), as subjects to the 
Emperor. 102  Thus Japan’s Invisible Minorities, by definition, were 
phenotypically similar enough to Japanese in most cases to “pass” as 
“Japanese.” As Fish acknowledges, “Japan had dealt with issues of 
diversity throughout its colonial period, but rarely involving people with 
such stark phenotypical difference [as “mixed-blood” children]. After all 
when looking at a pre-war photograph, one would often be hard-pressed to 
pick out the Chinese or Korean living in Japan based on facial features 
alone.”103 However, as seen above, this also encouraged scholarship that 
misunderstood nation-state racialization processes, by arguing that 
because Japan’s minorities were not visible, there was no “color stigmata,” 
therefore Japan’s discrimination was ethnic, not racial. 
Even after Japan shed its empire in the Postwar Era, many Invisible 
Minorities in fact continued to “pass” in Japanese society: most Zainichi 
Koreans adopted Japanese tsūshōmei (names for public use), while others, 
 
 
 99. Fish, supra note 34, at 41–43. 
 100. Id. at 42. 
 101. Id. at 44. 
 102. “Dominant Japanese”: Aoki, supra note 13, at 185; Isolated and eradicated: cf. CHUN-CHIEH 
HUANG, HUMANISM IN EAST ASIAN CONFUCIAN CONTEXTS 52 (2010); Shin, supra note 64, at 60.  
 103.  Fish, supra note 34, at 45. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
718 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 14:695 
 
 
 
 
such as entertainers, “passed” as Japanese in order to establish and 
maintain careers in Japan.104 Burakumin were often not uncovered and 
discriminated against until background checks were carried out before 
employment or marriage to a non-Burakumin.105 Some minority children 
did not consider themselves “foreign” until they were required to register 
as gaikokujin with the ward office at the age of fourteen (later sixteen), to 
give their fingerprints like potential criminal suspects, and to carry their 
registry cards on their person at all times—thus being socially “othered” 
from their peers at a delicate age.106 Thus most minorities in Japan were 
not only phenotypically “invisible” as they “passed” within Japanese 
society, but were also officially “invisible” within the national discourse of 
a minority-free “homogeneous Japan.” This homogeneity was further 
reified and made hegemonic under nihonjinron ("theories of 
Japaneseness”)107 discourse fostering superiority complexes. The narrative 
gained further currency during Japan’s intellectual and popular debate 
discussing the alleged causes of its high-speed growth in the 1960s, 1970s, 
and 1980s, and percolated through worldwide scholarship and media 
discourse on Japanese society as an emerging economic giant.108 
IV. TESTING THE PARADIGM OF EMBEDDED RACISM 
A. Managing Immediate Challenges to Japan’s New Postwar 
“Homogeneity” Narrative: The “Konketsuji Problem” 
It is instructive to discuss how Japanese society handled an early 
challenge to the Postwar domestic discourse of homogeneity: the existence 
of mixed-blood children (konketsuji). Although Yoshino declares, “one 
will always be Japanese by virtue of blood,” Japanese intermarried and 
had international children with Japanese blood, but who were visually 
identifiable as “foreign.”109 They were quickly linguistically differentiated 
through racialized epithets: konketsuji (“mixed-blood child”), ainoko 
(“alloyed child,” with overtones of “bastard”), hāfu, kuwātā (“half,” 
“quarter,” specifically indicating blood quanta) etc. 110  As Fish notes, 
 
 
 104. Tsuushoumei: cf. Cary, supra note 14, at 98. “Passed” as Japanese: cf. JOHN LIE, 
MULTIETHNIC JAPAN (2001); STERLING, supra note 50, at 51. 
 105. Cf. Neary, supra note 13, at 59 and 80–81. 
 106. See FUKUOKA, supra note 14, at 46 and 230–31. 
 107.  See, e.g., BEFU, supra note 17. 
 108. See BEFU, supra note 17; IIDA, supra note 53; OGUMA, supra note 51; STERLING, supra note 
50, at 48–50. 
 109. Yoshino, supra note 44, at 211. 
 110. JOHN DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF WORLD WAR II (1999). 
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“most people could identify a “mixed-blood” child with relative ease,” and 
“the emphasis on and perception of difference is not at all surprising.”111  
The immediate Postwar years (1945–1953) would fundamentally 
influence the debate on how those Visible Minorities (even those of 
“Japanese blood”) were to be treated. I agree with Shin’s conclusion that 
these policy precedents became the template for the social treatment of 
people who “looked American” yet were “mixed-blood Japanese” from 
the lower classes.112 But more importantly, these policies determined how 
future Visible Minorities in Japan (regardless of economic class) who 
were “fully foreign” (i.e., without “Japanese blood”: e.g., Caucasians, 
Middle-Easterners, South Americans, Africans and African-Americans, 
Subcontinental Indians, and South Asians, coming to Japan to live and 
work) were to be treated in Japanese society. Moreover, as the number of 
Visible Minorities who were in fact Japanese citizens grew through 
international marriages, the dominant discourse of clear lines between 
Japanese and Gaijin began to blur.113 
Despite this blurring, Japan sought to keep the line between Japanese 
and Gaijin intact. Japan’s paradigms for determining ‘self” and “Other” 
offers an instructive example of the patterns for social “othering” that 
continue to the present day. Fish describes how Japan’s policymakers and 
media dealt with Japan’s immediate Postwar konketsuji:114 
Step One: Politicians and bureaucrats drew attention to a looming 
“problem” (mondai) that would soon need addressing; in the case of the 
konketsuji, Japan’s Postwar national narrative involved a return to Japan’s 
“peaceful, tranquil homogeneous state”, and that homogeneity would 
allegedly create problems for those children who were not themselves 
“homogeneous” (by lacking “pure” Japanese blood).115 
Step Two: The GOJ drew up a policy proposal itemizing specific 
problems to be addressed, with high-level contributions from intellectuals, 
 
 
 111. Fish, supra note 34, at 45. 
 112. Shin, supra note 64; Fish, supra note 34, at 45. 
 113. There have of course been many people in Japan’s media who would be classified as 
konketsuji (albeit called “half”), including currently baseball star Yū Darvish, Enka singer Jerome 
Charles White Jr. (a.k.a. Jero), Miss Japan 2015 Ariana Miyamoto, and TV stars Rebecca Eri Ray 
Vaughan (a.k.a. Bekkī), Umemiya Anna and Miyazawa Rie. Although all are famous and acclaimed 
for their Japanese roots (in a phenomenon called “They’ll claim us if they’re famous” in Whiteness 
Studies), they are still socially asterisked as “half” Japanese if they are visually identifiable as 
“Gaijin.” A case in point is Miyazawa Rie, who is so completely identifiable as “Japanese” only 
(despite her selling point as a “half” in a 1991 nude pictorial) that she can “pass”: today’s youth 
(according to my classroom surveys 2008–2011) are largely unaware of her foreign roots. 
 114. Fish, supra note 34, at 45–53. 
 115. For examples of Peaceful, tranquil homogeneous state, see OGUMA, supra note 51, at 299. 
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politicians, bureaucrats and specialists in special deliberation councils 
(shingikai). In the case of the konketsuji, the shingikai policy conclusions 
were constructive: make sure that these children were educated properly in 
the Japanese school system as any other Japanese, and treat them equally 
as “Japanese.” In this case, the “problems” included (a) the apparent 
shame of konketsuji being visibly identifiable as sired by American 
soldiers, (b) the apparent disabilities of being raised in a single-mother 
family (under a phenotypically-based presumption of a mother being 
involved in prostitution), (c) the anticipation of probable stigmatization 
and non-acceptance by one’s school peers, and (d) the inability to function 
in Japanese society due to phenotype.  
Step Three was public debate: Politicians in the Diet and prefectural 
level offered ponderous musings on how Japan’s “character” and 
“Japaneseness” would be affected by this apparent dilution of Japan’s 
race/ethnicity. The media and the public discourse repeatedly cited 
(according to Fish (46), erroneous) statistics of 100,000 (and growing) 
“mixed-blood children”, offering a metaphor of the remnants of the 
American Occupation through its prostitutes (46–50). This stereotype 
would be propagated through popular culture, including films, 
newspapers, memoirs, poetry, and even school speeches and essays.  
However, instead of an original, inclusive narrative (i.e., that these 
heterogeneous children were a positive part of Japan’s future), the 
homogeneous society narrative (under which these heterogeneous children 
were a remaining aberration of Japan’s past) became predominant. 
Nevertheless, since these heterogeneous children were blameless for their 
existence, official dictum from the Ministry of Education et al. portrayed 
konketsuji as objects of pity, as children “who carry the destiny of 
misfortune on their backs.”116 The national narrative concluded that these 
unfortunate children were from irresponsible relationships on the parents” 
level.  
Step Four, the collection of data that substantiated the anticipated status 
quo, was soon completed and disseminated through the media to confirm 
the expectation that konketsuji in fact did not do as well in school as their 
“regular,” “pure-blooded” counterparts.117  
Finally, over time, Step Five embedded the racialized mindset into the 
national narrative. As the stigmatized and unstigmatized children grew up 
together, the perpetually-conjectured causes of their putative blood-based 
 
 
 116. Fish, supra note 34, at 53. 
  117. Id. at 54. 
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differences would be attributed to, for example, actual racism and racial 
discrimination, socio-economics, difficulties fitting into Japan’s 
homogeneous society, social opprobrium associated with being abandoned 
by foreign fathers, or, as the Ministry of Education officially claimed, the 
“rough personalities” of the differentiated children themselves. 118 
B. Implicit Power Relations: Viewing the “Konketsuji Problem” Anew 
through the Lens of “Embedded Racism”  
However, Fish’s excellent historical research was perhaps unaware of 
the racism embedded within this daisy chain of policy drives. Fish himself 
oddly concluded that “race, per se” was not the source of consistent 
problems (he instead attributes it to social reactions both by and towards 
the people being stigmatized, in an apparent confusion of cause and 
effect). 119 
I would suggest a different lens for viewing the konketsuji mondai. Let 
us reexamine the data above through the lens of Embedded Racism, 
considering the structural interplays of power and its effects over the 
dominant discourse and mindsets in Japanese society: 
First, consider the assumptions of the Postwar “peaceful homogeneous 
Japan” narrative as noted by Oguma: The converse association implicitly 
became that “heterogeneity” (as seen in the konketsuji) would not be 
peaceful or tranquil—i.e., that “non-homogeneous” people would be 
“trouble” and create “problems” for assimilation due to their obvious and 
unquestioned “differences.” 
Second, without any scientific basis or evidence, overcautious 
policymakers made an a priori assumption that phenotypical differences 
would automatically result in different behavior and treatment on both 
sides. In other words, contrary to Spickard’s argument that “races are not 
types,” and confirming Freire’s argument that, “In order to exist, one must 
be named. . . Saying haafu existed meant this group existed,” the GOJ 
officially created and named a “mixed-blood type of Japanese.”120 This 
gained immediate public legitimacy and hegemony in the national 
narrative because it came from the Ministry of Education. 
 
 
 118. Fish supra note 34, at 45–56. 
 119. Id. at 55–56. 
 120. Paul Spickard, The Illogic of American Racial Categories, in RACIALLY MIXED PEOPLE IN 
AMERICA 12, 20–22 (Maria P.P. Root ed., 1992); Theresa K. Williams, Prism Lives: Identity of 
Binational Amerasians, in RACIALLY MIXED PEOPLE IN AMERICA 280, 302 (Maria P.P. Root ed., 
1992).  
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Third, the phenotypical difference itself then became entangled in 
public narratives of shame, pity, and parental irresponsibility—which also 
made it impossible for people visually identified as konketsuji who were 
not products of unions of prostitutes and soldiers to escape the stigma.  
Fourth, although official claims were that konketsuji were the same as 
“Japanese,” it was still a differentiation as a “type” of Japanese—a 
‘sameness” with an asterisk: konketsuji were supposed to be the same, but 
were, due to unfortunate birth-determined circumstances beyond their 
control, not the same. This then became folded into a national narrative of 
pity and victimization that made asterisking these children not an act of 
scorn or hatred, but an act of kindness. That made it difficult for anyone to 
protest this differentiated treatment as unnecessary or ill-intentioned (for 
who would be so cruel as to pretend that putative differences did not 
exist?).  
Fifth, although there was positive enforcement of publicly-stated 
equality for konketsuji, there is no clear indication in the historical record 
of an enforcement mechanism in cases of people (such as bullies) who 
would not respect that equality—to deter or punish racists found in every 
society. Because there is no law specifically against racial discrimination 
in Japan, there was then, as now, no protection for these children—for 
they were, like everyone else, not officially a minority in Japan. They were 
supposed to be “Japanese” (albeit with caveats and asterisks), even if their 
asterisked status was as clear as the “foreignness” of their face.  
Thus, by being differentiated by even well-meaning authorities, 
konketsuji could neither “pass” due to blood conceits, nor were they 
allowed “multiple identifications” due to the binary nature of 
“Japaneseness” under the “homogeneous Japan” narrative also being 
reinforced by a new Postwar jus sanguinis Nationality Law. 121 
In sum, the policymaking apparatus for dealing with Postwar konketsuji 
Japanese further embedded restrictions in the concept of “Japanese”—to 
not only jus sanguinis blood ties to citizenship, but also “pure-blooded” 
ties.122 This official treatment of a generation of konketsuji who could not 
 
 
 121.  See ARUDOU, EMBEDDED RACISM, supra note 27, at chapter 4. 
 122. Also note that because Japan’s Nationality Law (Kokuseki Hō) was not amended to allow 
Japanese citizenship to pass through the Japanese mother until 1985, this had the effect of 
compounding issues of blood ties with gender. Until 1985, liaisons between Japanese women and non-
Japanese men could not produce Japanese citizens. Not only did this inconveniently associate Japanese 
mothers of international unions with prostitutes, but it also denied the civil rights afforded by 
citizenship to their otherwise “Japanese” children. See ARUDOU, EMBEDDED RACISM, supra note 27, 
at chapter 4, particularly 80–87, and footnote 5. The official English translation of the Nationality Law 
of Japan is on the Ministry of Justice website at www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/information/tnl-01.html.  
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“pass” as “Japanese” during the during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s set the 
tone for treatment of people who came to Japan during the 1980s, 1990s, 
and 2000s. These future workers and immigrants included people of color 
would be visually identified, typified, and “othered” as full Gaijin without 
even the asterisk of Japanese blood. Thus unlike many of the konketsuji, 
they were placed in an even more powerless situation in Japanese society, 
as they lacked official government policies protecting them as Japanese 
citizens.  
Thus, viewing Fish’s research through the lens of Embedded Racism 
provides a different and more powerful insight into an array of structural 
power relations, coupled with a more effective analysis of the dynamics of 
public policy that enfranchised racist mindsets towards “foreigners” in 
Japanese society. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article has attempted to demonstrate how prominent scholarship 
on Japan has systematically elided a fundamental process of 
discrimination, omitting skin color and phenotypical markers from their 
analysis that indicate that racialization processes occur within Japanese 
society as elsewhere. By proposing and applying an analytical paradigm of 
Embedded Racism inspired by Critical Race Theory, this Article finds that 
a form of Colorism exists in Japan despite the claims that “homogeneous, 
monoethnic Japan” has no “races,” therefore no racial discrimination. 
Looking at hitherto flawed analysis on Japan through this paradigm 
reveals more performative insights on a newfound discriminated group in 
Japan, the Visible Minorities, are treated, and how racialization processes 
are normalized to the point of hegemony within Japanese identity, to the 
point where one must “look Japanese” in order to be treated as one. This 
has significant implications for Japan’s future, for if Japan cannot create 
“new Japanese” through legal and social processes without phenotype 
voiding their equal treatment, its future as a young, dynamic society, as its 
birthrate continues below replacement levels, its population continues to 
decrease, and its demographics continue to grey, is in jeopardy. This is not 
sustainable, and acknowledging that both Visible Minorities and an 
Embedded Racism exist in Japan as in any other society is a crucial first 
step. 
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